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ABSTRACT: Answering to local expectations and the need for a reliant partner for the US 
Army in the fight against ISIS, a Kurdish-based de facto autonomous territory emerged 
in Northern Syria, which later turned into a multicultural entity. The characteristically 
leftist political, social, and economic changes implemented by the new regime differ 
considerably from the government models practised in the region; however, they also 
trigger significant criticism. Although in 2018 and 2019, the entity suffered important 
losses in territory due to the geopolitical interests of Russia, the US, and Turkey, the Au-
tonomous Administration of North and East Syria still could be a solid pillar in Syria’s 
future. This is not only due to its strategic and military importance, but also because the 
political system could provide, nevertheless, after some changes, an alternative for the 
Middle East in terms of multicultural governance, women’s rights and society-building 
based on mutual respect.
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INTRODUCTION 
The social, political and economic landscape of the Middle East has been reshaped by 
conflicts like the ongoing one in Syria. This civil war has created at least four different 
models of society building in one country, out of which this paper would like to examine 
the one implemented in the northern region. The aim of this paper is to present the distinct 
socio-economic model invigorated there, and the geopolitical challenges the model faces 
and creates. 
To this end, Section I. presents the main characteristics of the Kurdish population gener-
ally, while Section II. focuses on the Kurds living in Syria and their history before the Arab 
Spring. Section III. shows the main features of the socio-economic changes implemented 
in Northern Syria after the Syrian regime’s withdrawal. Section IV. briefly describes Da-
mascus’ approach towards Rojava, while Section V. presents the Turkish perspective of the 
ongoing community-building. Section VI. concludes and gives some perspectives regarding 
the future of the territory.
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I. KURDS – A COMMUNITY IN A STRATEGIC PERIPHERAL LAND
Rojava, West in Kurdish, is the colloquial name to describe the de facto autonomous region 
in Northern Syria, officially called Rojava–Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. The 
territory is the southward extension of the Kurdish populated area in Turkey.1 Kurds, who 
number around 30 to 40 million, are deemed to be the biggest nation on earth without a state 
of their own.
The region inhabited by the Kurds is a peripheral one lying along the geopolitical fault 
line between the power centres in the Middle East. Nevertheless, keeping positions in Kurd-
istan is a major goal for all these countries, not only because of prestige, but also due to the 
fresh water and oil resources there. However, the borders separating Kurds were permeable 
for centuries, permitting not only a vivid economic cooperation between the different tribes, 
but also providing refuge in case of need. In the last decades, frontiers became more secured, 
protected by wire-mesh fences, minefields and air surveillance, reducing crossing only to 
authorized points and persons. Nevertheless, this feature faded to a certain extent as region-
al instability grew. The fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) have proved that cooperation 
among the communities on the different sides of the border is still alive. 
Some argue that there is no single Kurdish nation. Taking Andersons’s definition for 
the nation: ‘an imagined and sovereign community limited from other nations’,3 there 
1 Vanly, I. Ch. “The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon”. In Kreyenbroek, Ph. G. and Sperl, S. (eds), The Kurds: A Con-
temporary Overview. London, New York: Routledge, 2005. 113.
2 “The Feyli Kurds of Iraq”, https://ethnicgeography.wordpress.com/2013/10/07/the-feyli-kurds-part-3-the-feyli-
kurds-of-iraq/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
3 Anderson, B. Imagined Communities. London, New York: Verso, 2006. 6–7.
Map 1 Kurds in the Middle East2
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could be counter arguments that Kurds meet these criteria. The Kurdish language itself is 
derived from the ancient Median language and is divided now into three main groups, the 
Northern (Kurmanji), the Central (Sorani) and the Southern (Pehlewani); nevertheless, 
millions of Kurds speak Zaza and Gorani as mother tongue. Due to historical reasons, not 
only the dialects differ but also the alphabet, according to the country Latin, Arab, Persian 
and even Cyrillic alphabets are used. The Kurmanji, spoken mostly by Kurds in Turkey 
and Syria, is the language of around two thirds of the Kurdish population and is official 
in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan; however, in the latter the majority speak Sorani.4 Despite 
their territories having been integrated into various countries for almost one hundred 
years, or in the case of Iran even more, there has been a growing tendency of considering 
Kurds from other regions’ fellow-nationals. This has been strengthened by the existence 
of pan-Kurdish organizations, like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the political co-
operation of various Kurdish parties, and the rise of the self-governing territories in Iraq 
and recently in Syria.
Kurdish society is traditional; the role of clans is still an important point of reference. 
During the 19th century, traditional Kurdish leaders were not interested in nationalism gain-
ing ground fearing that that would undermine their power within the communities.5 In 1918, 
there were great hopes for creating a Kurdish state, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1920 even 
generated an autonomous Kurdistan within Turkey with the option of holding a referendum 
on independence. Such hopes; however, vanished after the victory of Atatürk’s army. Af-
ter WWII, a short-lived Kurdish Autonomous Republic was created in Iran, which helped 
Kurdish language to gain ground in public spaces. Similar effects led to the establishment 
of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Rojava in Syria; however, these latter represent a more 
complex case of state and society building, due to their social, military and economic role 
and the weakness of the central states. The only Kurdish region without similar experience 
is the one belonging to Turkey, where there has been an ongoing armed conflict for inde-
pendence, and later autonomy, between the state and the Kurdish insurgents affiliated with 
the PKK for decades.
Since the Treaty of Sevres in 1920,6 until recently, Kurdish independence has not been 
seriously considered, mainly due to the complex geopolitical reality of the region. Despite 
the strong popular support to the PKK on the ground and its communist agenda, not even 
the Soviet Union supported their struggle for independence due to Moscow’s regional 
interests. Although the PKK was provided support by various communist regimes eager to 
help the liberation cause elsewhere, none of them dared to get involved into the creation 
of Kurdish independence without the backing of the Soviet Union.7 The US wars against 
Iraq in 1990 and 2003 brought significant changes: Iraqi Kurdistan emerged as a self-gov-
erning region, distancing itself from Baghdad, and holding ultimately an unrecognized 
4 On Kurdish see for instance “Kurdish Language”. The Kurdish Project. https://thekurdishproject.org/histo-
ry-and-culture/kurdish-culture/kurdish-language/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.; “The Kurdish language”. 
Kurdistan Regional Government. http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=215, Accessed on 24 January 2020.; 
“Kurdish (Kurdî / کوردی)”. Omniglot. https://www.omniglot.com/writing/kurdish.htm, Accessed on 24 January 
2020.
5 McDowall, D. A Modern History of the Kurds. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007. 467–468.
6 The first peace treaty signed with Turkey after WWI, revised by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, after the Turk-
ish War of Independence.
7 “A Mountain River Has Many Bends”. Tangled Wilderness. 13. March 2015. http://www.tangledwilderness.
org/a-mountain-river-has-many-bends/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
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referendum on independence on 25 September 2017, when the overwhelming majority 
supported independence. Despite the referendum, the cooperation between Baghdad and 
Erbil did not end; however, the town of Kirkuk and its surrounding – occupied in 2012 
after the collapse of the Iraqi Army – was retaken by Iraqi government forces as a conse-
quence in October 2017.
II. KURDS IN SYRIA BEFORE THE ARAB SPRING
According to various estimations, Kurds make up around 8-10% of the Syrian population, 
constituting the largest minority and the only one having a specific territorial base. This 
feature allowed them to form a region of their own after the withdrawal of the Syrian regime 
in 2012. Unlike in Iraqi Kurdistan, in Syria there was neither prelude to Rojava8 nor official 
use of Kurdish, and in Turkey, Syrian Kurds had no possibility to rebel against the state op-
pression due to the lack of proper conditions for a guerrilla warfare. 
Nevertheless, Kurdish population has been autochthonous in Rojava since the 11th cen-
tury; many of the Syrian Kurds are descendants of those who fled Turkey in the 1920s, after 
a Kurdish rebellion was crashed there. Their influx soon resulted in transforming the region 
into a rear base for anti-Turkey Kurdish activity, however, the then acting French adminis-
tration discouraged any political or military move against the northern neighbour.9 Yet, the 
French contributed to the strengthening of the minority identity in order to weaken the Sunni 
Arab majority in Syria.10 
After Syria gained independence, due to the lack of trust and because of the diverging 
visions on the future, Kurds became a minority treated unfavourable. The situation worsened 
with the spread of the Arab nationalism in the 1950s.11 After 1946, the first organization to 
overcome discrimination was the unrecognized underground Kurdish Democratic Party of 
Syria, established in 1957, with the aim of ensuring Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights, 
economic development and democratization of the Syrian political life. Yet, the exclusion 
and pauperization of the Kurds resulted in the fact that many of the intellectuals subordi-
nated nationalist feelings to class struggle and Kurds achieved a disproportionately large 
representation within the Communist Party of Syria.12
After declaring the Syrian Arab Republic in 1961, life became even harder: a state or-
ganized campaign unfolded against Kurds. The change was related to the discovery of the 
oil resources in the northeast region of Syria and the Iraqi Kurdistan uprising. A particularly 
important document was a decree in 1962, which deprived around 120,000 Kurds, or 20 
percent of the Syrian Kurds of Syrian nationality.13 In 1963, Damascus joined Iraq in its war 
against Iraqi Kurdistan, further deteriorating Arab-Kurdish relations within Syria. Syrian of-
ficials considered Kurdish attempts in northern Iraq dangerous as the then head of the Syrian 
8 In the 1930s, there was an attempt to gain autonomy for al-Jazira province, however, turned down by the 
French authorities. Gorgas, J. T. “Les territoires de marge de la Syrie mandataire : le mouvement autonomiste 
de la Haute Jazîra, paradoxes et ambiguïtés d’une intégration « nationale » inachevée (1936-1939)”. Revue des 
mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 2. 2009. DOI:10.4000/remmm.6481, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
9 Vanly. “The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon”. 117.
10 This proved to be useful when crushing the revolt against the French rule in 1925.
11 Tejel, J. Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society. London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 
2009. 48.
12 McDowall. A Modern History of the Kurds. 472.
13 On the process see Tejel. Syria’s Kurds. 49–52.
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secret service in Al-Hasakah compared the Kurdish cause to the example of Israel in a doc-
ument compiled for the government, arguing that while Israel was an ‘imperialism’-created 
fait accompli for the Arab world, Kurdistan, a second ‘Judastan’ could be the same made 
by ‘communists’.14 Nevertheless, the disclosure of the plan generated indignation, Syrian 
Kurdish political parties recognized the importance of wording and since the 1970s they 
have dropped the term ‘Kurdistan’ and use the word ‘Kurdish’ instead.15 
In order to weaken Kurdish presence forced Arabization, deprivation of citizenship and 
property, and removal of population became practice in the Syrian–Turkish border region.16 
For instance, in 1973 and 2007, Syrian authorities confiscated Kurdish owned arable lands 
and gave them to Arab families brought from other parts of the country to change the ethnic 
composition.17 When the settlement program was stopped in 1976, there were already 41 
new villages in the hizami al-‘arabi, the ‘Arab Belt’ for settlers.18 Nevertheless, despite these 
attempts, the territory remained mostly Kurdish populated, and the overwhelming majority 
of the Kurds monolingual, unable to speak Arabic.19 
During the reign of Hafez al-Assad, in the eyes of the Sunni Arab majority Kurds be-
came allies of the oppressing regime, because they contributed to the repression of the Sunni 
revolts in the 1980s.20 However, on the contrary, Kurds were generally not favoured, and 
the 1980s and 1990s saw further regulations to suppress Kurdish language and identity, 
although some Kurds were co-opted by the regime during Hafez al-Assad’s reign.21 This 
oppression had not changed prior to the Arab Spring, and the existence of tensions became 
visible by such events like the Qamishlo uprising in 2004.22 
As Kurds live in four countries, they have frequently been subjects of or partners in 
foreign involvement into the affairs of the neighbouring states. While in the 1960s Damas-
cus helped Baghdad in a war against Iraqi Kurdistan; in the 1980s they sided with Iraqi 
Kurdistan against Baghdad due to the disputes between al-Assad and Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein. Syria also provided shelter for the reorganization of and recruitment to the PKK 
after the group had to flee Turkey following the military coup there in 1980.23 This help 
was so important, that in 1996 PKK-leader Abdullah Öçalan openly declared that Syria 
14 Vanly. “The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon”. 121–122.
15 McDowall. A Modern History of the Kurds. 478.
16 “Syria–The Silenced Kurds”. Human Rights Watch Reports 8/4. 1996. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria.
htm, Accessed on 24 January 2020. Between 1954 and 1961, the population of Hasakah province grew by 27 
percent, which cannot be explained merely by natural increase. McDowall. A Modern History of the Kurds, 473.
17 “Persecution and Discrimination against Kurdish Citizens in Syria”. Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights. http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session12/SY/KIS-KurdsinSyr-
ia-eng.pdf, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
18 McDowall. A Modern History of the Kurds. 475.
19 Vanly. “The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon”. 116.
20 Vanly. “The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon”. 125.; McDowall. A Modern History of the Kurds. 477.
21 Tejel. Syria’s Kurds. 65–68.
22 On 12 March 2004, after atrocities at a soccer match between the Kurdish supporters of Qamishlo and the Arab 
supporters of Deir Ez-Zor during which the Syrian security forces acted against the Kurds, killing six people, 
including three children, Kurdish protesters burned down the local Ba’ath Party office and toppled the statue 
of Hafez al-Assad. After the events the Syrian Army recaptured the town, killing over 30 Kurds, and arresting 
2,000, while many Kurds fled for KRG in Iraq.
23 The popular support for the PKK was extremely strong in Kobanî and in the Kurd Mountains – today Afrin re-
gion – in north-western Syria. Allsopp, H. The Kurds of Syria. Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East. 
I.B. Tauris, 2015. 103.
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had no Kurds of its own and those living there were all refugees from Turkey.24 The Syr-
ia–PKK cooperation lasted until 1998, when Turkey managed to achieve the break of that, 
with strengthening the relations with Israel, and threatening Damascus with a military 
intervention.25 
III. ROJAVA – A COMMUNITY-BUILDING PROJECT 
As Syrian authorities withdrew from the Kurdish regions in August 2012, when the battle 
for Aleppo started, control remained to local forces. The already existing underground Dem-
ocratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) formed the Kurdish 
Supreme Committee (KSC) for governing and administrating the territory and the PYD-af-
filiated People’s Protection Units (YPG) became the force of armed self-defence. Later PYD 
renounced cooperation with KNC after the latter, in close cooperation with the Iraqi Kurdis-
tan, whose President, Massud Barzani is a partner of Turkey, insisted on sharing power with-
in Rojava, and tried to form its own militia, a rival to YPG. Since then, the KNC, supported 
by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, has been strongly opposing the existence of the autonomous 
administration, similarly to the Syrian National Council (SNC).26 
However, states and political scientists generally reject the idea of territorial autono-
my in the third world because it impedes ‘nation-building’, and is therefore ‘retrogressive’. 
Some scholars agree that as most states do grant neither collective nor individual human 
rights and communities are not protected against state abuse, autonomy should be provided 
where it serves justice and human dignity, since then it is ‘progressive’.27 In strengthening 
the international recognition of the PYD and that of the YPG, the siege of Kobanî was a turn-
ing point. Then, at the peak of the ISIS, US policymakers impressed by the local resistance 
established working relations with the YPG.28 As the US program to train and equip Syrian 
rebels to fight ISIS had proven to be a failure by that time, the YPG managed to stabilize its 
position as a reliable ally of Washington. Alongside the war against ISIS, another articulated 
US goal was the promotion of democracy in the MENA region.29 This also largely resonated 
with the developments in Rojava, where the situation developed compared to the previous 
administration, even if some call that ‘a new form of a decentralized non-state government 
24 McDowall. A Modern History of the Kurds. 479–480.
25 Cagaptay S. “Syria and Turkey: The PKK Dimension”. The Washington Institute. 5 April 2012. http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syria-and-turkey-the-pkk-dimension, Accessed on 24 January 
2020.
26  In the beginning the SNC, formed in Istanbul on 23 August 2011, was hoped to become a Syrian government in 
exile. Such hopes failed; however, many countries have recognized it as a partner, although Kurds have barely 
been involved into the SNC: only the small party of Kurdish Future Movement in Syria is represented. A mem-
ber of the Kurdish Future Movement, also a member of the city council in Darbasiyah in Jazira, was arrested 
by the PYD administration on 1 April 2017. “Member of the Kurdish Future Movement arrested by Kurdish 
Self-management forces in al Darbasiya city in Hasaka governorate on April 1”. Syrian Network for Human 
Rights. 1 April 2017. http://sn4hr.org/blog/2017/04/01/member-kurdish-future-movement-arrested-kurd-
ish-self-management-forces-al-darbasiya-city-hasaka-governorate-april-1/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
27 Safran, W. “Spatial and Functional Dimensions of Autonomy: Cross-national and Theoretical Perspectives”. In 
Safran, W. and Máiz, R. (eds), Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies. London, Portland: Frank 
Cass, 2000. 19–20.
28 Hassan, H. “The Battle for Raqqa and the Challenges after Liberation” CTC Sentinel 10/6. 2017. 2.
29 About the US policy in the Middle East see Echagüe, A. “The United States: redefining engagement?”. In 
Kausch, K. (ed), Geopolitics and Democracy in the Middle East. Madrid: FRIDE, 2015. 181–193.
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without hierarchy’.30 The ideological basis for the implemented social and economic chang-
es stems from the thoughts of the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öçalan, who is consid-
ered to be the spiritual leader of the PYD.
The growing military importance of the PYD and YPG had led to changes in how power 
is exercised in Rojava by the time they started to expand their control to territories populated 
by Sunni Arab majority. Those territories long opposed the Syrian regime because of being 
oppressed by Damascus and to some extent were supportive to the ISIS, regarding the terror-
ist group a guardian angel of Sunnis. As a consequence of this, a secular Kurdish rule would 
not have been an appropriate reason for Sunni Arabs to fight for or even to tolerate being 
subjugated to. Understanding the need for a change, as early as 2013, the PYD called for the 
creation of a progressive multi-ethnic region in wider Rojava, beyond the ethnic borders of 
the Kurds. The change was reflected also in the constitution of 2014, unrecognized by Syria, 
and in the renaming of the territory to Rojava–Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, in 
December 2016.
As the political system changed, the military approach also had to be subjected to 
changes. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a multi-ethnic and multi-religious alliance 
of Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian, Armenian, Turkmen and Circassian militias – was founded in 
October 2015, and declared the official defence force of Rojava by the December 2016 
constitution. The SDF–US Army partnership has facilitated the cooperation between Kurd 
and Arab forces, because the latter started to see SDF and Rojava as an American project 
and a ‘life insurance’ since US military presence makes it difficult for Damascus to attack 
the liberated areas.31 Due to the growing share of non-Kurdish population in the extending 
territory of Rojava, the SDF cannot be considered any more “a subsidiary of the YPG”32, or 
simply a tool for Kurds to expand their influence in predominantly Arab areas. According to 
Pentagon estimations, in March 2017 the SDF was made of Kurd forces in 40 percent and 
Arabs in 60 percent.33 The role of women is also important: in 2016, they made up about 30 
to 40 percent of the YPG in the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ),34 while on 10 July 2017, 
the first Arab female battalion was organized on the outskirts of Raqqa.35
After the administrative reform of July 2017, Rojava–Democratic Federation of North-
ern Syria was composed of three regions, Jazira (Hasakah), Euphrates (Kobanî), and Afrin, 
while some territories under SDF control were not organized into them (in blue on Map 2). 
The Turkish interventions in 2018 and 2019 led to changes both in territory and administra-
tive organization of the territory. The region was renamed to Autonomous Administration of 
30 “A Mountain River Has Many Bends”.
31 Hassan, H. “The Battle for Raqqa”. 4.
32 “Global powers seek to revive diplomatic process”. The Economist. 12 February 2016. http://country.eiu.com/
article.aspx?articleid=1363937520&Country=Syria&topic=Politics, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
33 “News Transcript of the Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Townsend via teleconference from 
Baghdad, Iraq”. US Department of Defence. 1 March 2017. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Tran-
script-View/Article/1099469/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-townsend-via-teleconference-from-
ba/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
34 Sido, K. “Rojava – a protection zone for religious and ethnic minorities in northern Syria?”. Gesellschaft für 
bedrohte Völker. June 2016. https://www.gfbv.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Reporte_Memoranden/2016/North-
ern-Syria-research-trip-2016.compressed.pdf, 5. Accessed on 24 January 2020., Baumstieger, M. “Rojda Felat”. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 November 2016. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/profil-rojda-felat-1.3239571, Ac-
cessed on 24 January 2020.
35 “SDF creates female Arab battalion in eastern Syria to fight patriarchy and ISIS”. Al Shahid. 12 July 2017. 
https://alshahidwitness.com/sdf-female-arab-battalion-eastern-syria/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
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North and East Syria (NES), based on the regions of Jazira, Euphrates, and Afrin (despite the 
fact that the seat is occupied by Turkey), and local councils of Raqqa, Manbij, Tabqa, and 
Deir ez-Zor; under the leadership of the 70-member General Council, however, the power of 
the regions has decreased as seen on Map 3.
Map 2 The regions of Rojava in mid-2017  
(Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Federation_of _Northern_Syria)
Map 3 NES in January 2020, dark green: SDF controlled territories, light green: SDF-control with 
Syrian military presence, red: Turkish-held territories  
(Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Claimed_and_de_ facto_territory_of _Rojava.png)
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Regions, as parts of the structure of the Democratic Autonomous Administration 
(DAA), are seen to be similar to the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), es-
tablished in 2005, to implement Öçalan’s democratic confederal model in the regions 
of Kurdistan. The KCK is an institutionalized umbrella structure overseeing its member 
organizations: the PKK in Turkey, the PYD in Syria, the Kurdistan Democratic Solution 
Party in Iraq and the Kurdistan Free Life Party in Iran, nevertheless, leaving them a great 
room for manoeuvre or autonomy.36 The DAA system in Rojava covers the three regions, 
comprises their legislative, judicial and executive councils and one general coordinating 
council acting for all the cantons. Each region has a government, which while ensuring 
cooperation with the others, implements its own policy and provides services. Policing is 
provided by the Asayish (‘security’ in Kurdish), a force organized in the regions. There is 
no federal government in Rojava.
A guideline elaborated by Öçalan and implemented by the SDF is the vision of the 
‘democratic nation’ according to which all ethnic groups must participate in the local 
government. The main political force of Rojava is the Movement for a Democratic Society 
(TEV-DEM) a multi-ethnic, leftist coalition, in which the PYD has a crucial role but which 
includes Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian and further Kurdish forces; however, all of them allied 
with the PYD. Practically, this means that although decentralized institutions are being 
built, power is heavily centralized in the hands of the PYD.37 As political views diverging 
from that of the PYD are excluded, the system implemented is not inclusive in the sense 
of political diversity.
After decades of Arabization, the current administration shows respect to multilingual-
ism: the authorities commonly use three languages, Arabic, Kurdish written with Latin al-
phabet, and Aramaic.38 Official signs of the administration and street signs in Christian vil-
lages are trilingual.39 Peaceful ethnic co-existence and the prevention of the alienation of the 
non-Kurdish elements of society are priorities; that is why the use of the flag of Kurdistan is 
not encouraged; however, officially not banned.40 
The 2016 constitution is unique in the Middle East, as it recognizes gender equality, 
minority rights, direct democracy and strives for social equality, while prohibits among oth-
ers polygamy, forced or underage marriage. Declared gender equality is almost unique in 
the region, women not only have equal rights, they form an important and recognized pillar 
of society and the military, too. A further implemented Öçalan guideline is that institutions 
must have both male and female leaders. These changes affect everyday life fundamentally. 
For illustrating this, the conservative, ethnically mixed and tribe-dominated, even largely 
ISIS-supportive town of Tell Abyad, previously subjected to forced Arabization, could have 
served as a blueprint. Before the Turkish invasion of 2019, two co-mayors, one of which a 
Kurdish woman in her late 20s, ran the town; while in the local council, with Arab majority, 
36 Khalaf, R. M. Governing Rojava: Layers of Legitimacy in Syria. London: Chatham House, 2016. 10–11. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-12-08-governing-rojava-khalaf.pdf, 
Accessed on 24 January 2020.
37 Khalaf. Governing Rojava. 10.
38 An ancient language in the Middle East belonging to the Afro-Asiatic language family and the Semitic subfami-
ly. The Aramaic, now endangered and spoken by several hundreds of thousand people, served as a lingua franca 
in the region for centuries.
39 Sido. “Rojava…”. 22.
40 Khalaf. Governing Rojava. 23.
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the representation of the minorities was ensured. Teaching was provided in both Arabic and 
Kurdish instead of solely Arabic.41 
The administration is not attempting to create a distinct political entity in Rojava: Syr-
ian identity cards, documents, and currency are still used. Similarly, Syrian legal system is 
applied if there is no conflict with the regional constitution; however, a distinct court system 
has been created in which lower courts’ decisions are made with the involvement of citi-
zens, while at higher levels the participation of trained jurists is compulsory.42 Sharia is not 
practised as the leading principle is secularism in Rojava; however, the diminution of men’s 
traditional domestic authority causes social unrest.
Decision-making is based on local communities, in accordance with traditions; decisions 
are made collectively and aspiring to unanimity.43 Due to security reasons, until today, there 
were only partial elections,44 but during the assignment of local leaders and councils some 
rules were respected. The councils already existed underground before the Arab Spring, 
when they were tools for the local population to solve problems on their own; however, 
these authorities were persecuted by the regime.45 After the autonomy was implemented, the 
councils became the backbone of the administration, assuring legitimacy and efficiency at 
the same time. Planned regional elections of 2014 and 2018 were postponed.
Primary and secondary education is free and carried out in mother tongue, in contrast 
to the Arabic-language instruction before 2012. However, the curriculum influenced by 
Öçalan’s views is triggering criticism, and diplomas issued by the regional authorities are 
not recognized elsewhere. In September 2017, despite Damascus’ approval, the PYD re-
jected the proposal of the UNICEF to take over the 2,000 schools operating in Hasakah in 
order to teach a standardized curriculum, as it turned down the intention to set up schools 
in the Al-Mabrouka displaced persons camp in rural Hasakah.46 Another issue emerged 
with the private schools first exempted from applying the regional curriculum. After some 
disputes in September 2018, a deal was achieved between the regional authorities and the 
local Syrian Orthodox archbishop, allowing for Assyrian private confessional schools to 
41 Van Wilgenburg, W. “Young female mayor breaks boundaries in Syrian town freed from Islamic State”. Middle 
East Eye. 1 July 2016. http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/young-female-mayor-breaks-bounda-
ries-syrian-town-freed-552711157, Accessed on 24 January 2020.; “They freed a Syrian town from ISIS. Now 
they have to govern it”. The Washington Post. 30 October 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-
challenges-of-governing-after-the-islamic-state/2015/10/30/8985938c-7673-11e5-a5e2-40d6b2ad18dd_story.
html?utm_term=.5833e928052b, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
42 Ayboğa, E. “The new justice system in Rojava”. 13 October 2014. http://www.biehlonbookchin.com/jus-
tice-system-in-rojava/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
43 Baher, Z. “The Experiment of West Kurdistan Has Proved That People Can Make Changes” Co-operation in 
Mesopotamia. 12 March 2016. https://cooperativeeconomy.info/the-experiment-of-west-kurdistan-has-proved-
that-people-can-make-changes/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
44 That election took place in March 2015 in the then controlled mostly Kurdish populated area, amid the boycott 
of the KNC. Under the previous regime functionaries were chosen and nominated by the Baath Party.
45 Lebsky, M. “The Economy of Rojava” Co-operation in Mesopotamia. 14 March 2017. https://cooperativeecon-
omy.info/the-economy-of-rojava/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
46 The reason in both cases was the non-implementation of the Rojava administration approved curriculum in-
fluenced by Öçalan’s views. Al-Wasl, Z. “PYD Refuses UNICEF Proposal to Administer 2,000 Schools in 
Hassakeh”. The Syrian Observer. 8 September 2017. https://syrianobserver.com/EN/news/22370/pyd_refus-
es_unicef_proposal_administer_schools_hassakeh.html, Accessed on 24 January 2020.; Khalaf. Governing 
Rojava. 18.
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teach in the first two grades the region’s curriculum, and in grades three to six the Damas-
cus-approved one.47
Higher education has also been created: a college providing teaching in Kurdish opened 
in Afrin in September 2015,48 while in Qamishlo the Rojava University opened in 2016, in 
cooperation with the Paris 8 University, with colleges of medicine, engineering, agricultural 
studies, communications and computer sciences, while the college of petroleum has been 
located in Rmelan city. After the Turkish invasion of Afrin in 2018, the college closed, 
however, in October 2019 it was announced that the University of Gaziantep, Turkey, would 
open faculties in the Northern Syrian towns of Afrin, Al-Bab and Azaz.49
Since the outbreak of the civil war the ethnic and religious composition of Syria has 
radically changed due to the exodus of many belonging to minorities and the arrival of 
internally displaced persons’ (IDP) to certain areas, what is true for Rojava, as well. For 
instance, before 2011 there were some 50 Yazidi villages in Hasakah/Jazira province, many 
of them no longer inhabited.50 As population exchange has become practiced widespread by 
every administration in Syria, some fear that the installation of Rojava could lead to ethnic 
cleansing despite the official slogans. However, there have been some examples to this, for 
instance tens of thousands of Arabs left the mentioned Tell Abyad due to the fear of retribu-
tion when the YPG took it in 2015,51 the general situation is the contrary, the number of the 
Arabs have doubled in Rojava since the beginning of the conflict,52 as many of the some 1.3 
million IDPs in Rojava belong to that group. Another Arab fear is attached to the recruitment 
of military-age people from the region under Rojava control, which sporadically produces 
protests showing the lack of trust between the groups. The Turkish invasions of 2018 and 
2019 have also altered the ethnic composition of the concerned regions, however reliable 
data is not available. What is known, for instance, is that in April 2018 a Kurdish-majority 
‘elders council’ was established in Afrin, indicating that even the Turkish invaders consid-
ered the town a Kurdish-majority one.53 Yet, Amnesty International warned that Turkey and 
her allies were committing human rights violations in Afrin.54 
After the Kurdish forces started to occupy non-Kurdish populated areas, a special ad-
ministrative regime, the military council, was introduced. The first one to set up was the 
Manbij military council in April 2016, composed of Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians and Turkomans 
47 Souleiman, D. “Syriacs protest Kurdish authorities over Syria school curriculum”. Yahoo News. 12 September 
2018. https://news.yahoo.com/kurds-christians-split-over-syria-school-curriculum-041427147.html, Accessed 
on 24 January 2020.
48 That was the first Kurdish-language higher education institution in Syria, and one of the main reasons for the 
creation was the commuting difficulties between Afrin and Aleppo due to the outbreak of the Civil War. Drwish, 
S. M. “Suriye’nin ilk Kürt üniversitesi tartışmalara neden oluyor”. Al-Monitor. 18 May 2016. http:// al-monitor.
com/pulse/tr/originals/2016/05/kurds-rojava-afrin-first-university-ideology-ocalan.html, Accessed on 24 Janu-
ary 2020.
49 Erkoyun, E. “Turkish university to open faculties in northern Syria” Reuters. 4 October 2019. https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-education-idUSKBN1WJ0Z3, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
50 Sido. “Rojava…”. 22.
51 “They freed…”.
52 Sido. “Rojava…”. 24.
53 “Interim local council established in Syria’s Afrin”. Hürriyet Daily News. 12 April 2018. http://www.hurriyet-
dailynews.com/interim-local-council-established-in-syrias-afrin-130227, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
54 “Syria: Turkey must stop serious violations by allied groups and its own forces in Afrin.” Amnesty International. 
2 August 2018. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/syria-turkey-must-stop-serious-violations-by-
allied-groups-and-its-own-forces-in-afrin/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
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with the aim of administering the town and the region after being captured from the ISIS. 
The reason behind was that Manbij is not only of strategic importance, but is also an Ar-
ab-majority town with many ethnic groups, which made such a precaution necessary before 
the offensive.55 In August 2016, similar military councils were formed for Jarabulus and Al-
Bab, both located in the neighbourhood of Manbij and taken by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) 
and the Turkish army in August 2016 and February 2017, respectively. The fourth military 
council was formed in December 2016 for Deir ez-Zor; however, the town’s siege was lifted 
in September 2017 by the Syrian Army, leaving Deir ez-Zor out of Rojava.
After the liberation of Manbij, a Legislative Assembly was formed which in March 
2017 created the Democratic Civilian Administration of Manbij and its Surroundings with 
two co-presidents to replace the military administration.56 The composition of the council, 
having 71 Arab, 43 Kurd, 10 Turkoman, 8 Circassian, 1 Armenian and 1 Chechen mem-
bers, shows the multi-ethnic feature of the region, and is also a good example of the ethnic 
inclusion the new administration is eager to emphasize.57 At first, the territory was incorpo-
rated into the Shahba region, created early in 2016, to administer the multi-ethnic territories 
between Afrin and Kobanî cantons; however, it was left outside the region system at the 
administrative reorganization in late July 2017.58 
From economic point of view the territory and the population of Rojava was long 
discriminated against by the regime; however, Syria had to rely on Rojava as 70% of the 
wheat was produced there and also the oil extracted had an important share in the national 
production. These sources contributed substantially to the economic self-reliance of Roja-
va after the withdrawal of the Syrian state.59 While the other regions are predominantly ag-
ricultural, Jazira is an economic engine; however, oil-refineries had to be built there since 
before the war such industry was concentrated in other parts of the country. Afrin profited 
a lot from the devastation of Aleppo, a significant part of the famous soap industry found 
refuge there.60 A major challenge was to rebuild water, electricity and road infrastructure, 
either destroyed during the war or collapsed after the withdrawal of the regime.61 Before 
capturing the Tabqa Dam in May 2017 and some minor dams earlier, electricity retailing 
55 In 2019, following the withdrawal of US and other Western troops from northern Syria, the Syrian Army and 
Russian military police entered Manbij to prevent a Turkish and a Free Syrian Army offensive.
56 “Manbij Democratic Civilian Administration Council takes office”. ANF News. 12 March 2017. https://anfeng-
lish.com/news/manbij-democratic-civilian-administration-council-takes-office-18957, Accessed on 24 January 
2020.
57 Some locals were complaining that the PYD dismantled the elected local council that had been operating prior 
to the ISIS occupation, and brought its own appointees historically linked to the regime and thus distrusted. 
Khalaf. Governing Rojava. 20.
58 After the administrative reorganization of Rojava in July 2017, Shahba was divided into two: the Tell Rifat area 
i.e. the western part of the region was incorporated into the Afrin region, while the Manbij area was left outside 
of the region system.
59 These also contributed to the survival of Rojava after a considerable number of IDPs arrived in the territory. Ac-
cording to the minister of economy of Afrin in 2014, Rojava can support a population two or three times larger 
than that lived there before the conflict. “Efrîn Economy Minister Yousef: Rojava challenging norms of class, 
gender and power”. DIHA. 22 December 2014. http://diclenews.com/en/news/content/view/436354, Accessed 
on 24 January 2020.
60 “Efrîn Economy Minister…”.
61 Evran, S. “Efrin Is Being Rebuilt, Calls for Support and Investment” The Rojava Report. 6 May 2014. 
https://rojavareport.wordpress.com/2014/05/06/efrin-is-being-rebuilt-calls-for-support-and-investment/, Accessed 
on 24 January 2020.
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was also a major problem, but the possession of these dams helps to supply the region with 
electricity and drinking water.
The economic model implemented in Rojava is an agrarian form of socialism based on 
cooperatives.62 The economic policy is not aiming either a capitalist or a communist regime, 
but seeking a ‘people’s economy’ based on cooperatives and communes, and provides general 
welfare and funding for science and technology.63 Banking is limited to handle savings and 
helping the communes; resource of financing is the output of the projects.64 Economic changes 
also resulted in the limitation of private property to two forms: personal (cars, electronic goods 
and personal belongings), and property based on direct use. The principle ‘ownership by use’ 
became the central idea, meaning that when a property is being used by a person or persons, the 
users own the land and structures but are not entitled to sell them on an open market.65 
After the seizure of power and the abolishment of the right to large private property, 
around 2/3 of the big property was ‘socialised’, i. e. put at the service of the population.66 
Aside from property owned by use, in principle any other property became common, held 
in stewardship by councils that are entitled to turn over these public goods to individu-
als for use. Local councils manage some 3/4 of the land while in the case of industry this 
share is 1/3.67 Oil industry is under the control of the councils and managed by the workers’ 
committees. Services like education, job provision–mainly in institutions–electricity, water, 
healthcare and security are provided by the Democratic Autonomous Administration (DAA) 
governance, the regions for a fee. In Hasakah parallel services are sometimes available, due 
to the existence of the regime enclaves.68 
Regions and councils implement their own economic policy; however, there is an Insti-
tute for Economic Development, an authority that regulates import and export trade, issues 
trading licences to individuals and elaborates modernization projects for the agriculture and 
industry in Rojava. Planning is crucial as the economy is still relying on agriculture and has 
been hit by the embargo imposed by neighbours, nevertheless, the situation improved after 
Iraqi Kurdistan opened the border in June 2016. Everything produced in Rojava is inexpen-
sive, as the economic model aims rather a social approach and redistribution of wealth than 
accumulation or creating a stock exchange. Other goods are brought from Iraqi Kurdistan or 
smuggled from Turkey or other parts of Syria, but expensive in every case.
Rojava started cementing its achievements during 2017, as the fight against the pseu-
do-state of ISIS became more likely to come to an end and the regime recaptured vast areas. 
In July 2017, the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the SDF, decided to hold 
communal, local and parliamentary elections on 22 September, 3 November 2017 and 1 Jan-
uary 2018, respectively, which the Syrian deputy foreign minister called a “joke”.69 These 
elections, however, were postponed due to the fighting, and have not been organized to date.
62 Baher, Z. “The Experiment of West Kurdistan Has Proved That People Can Make Changes”
63 Lebsky. “The Economy of Rojava”
64 Yousef, A. “The Social Economy in Rojava”. Kurdishquestion.com. 26 May 2015. http://kurdishquestion.com/
oldarticle.php?aid=the-social-economy-in-rojava, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
65 “A Mountain River Has Many Bends”
66 Lebsky. “The Economy of Rojava”
67 “A Mountain River Has Many Bends”.
68 Khalaf. Governing Rojava. 19.
69 Barrington, L. “Elections in Kurdish-led areas will not divide Syria: minister”. Reuters. 7 August 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds/elections-in-kurdish-led-areas-will-not-di-
vide-syria-minister-idUSKBN1AM0LM, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
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IV. ROJAVA SEEN FROM DAMASCUS
On 15 September 2017, Buthania Shaaban, a political adviser to the Syrian President, openly 
stated that Syria considers the SDF an illegitimate force, similarly to the ISIS, and would 
fight until regaining control over the whole country.70 The statement came after the break of 
the siege of Deir Ez-Zor, one of the most important victories the Syrian Army has achieved 
since 2012, with significant Russian support though.71 Just a few days later, in the context 
of the then coming referendum on independence in Iraqi Kurdistan, Syrian foreign minister 
Walid al-Moualem expressed Damascus’ readiness to negotiate with the Kurds about the de-
manded autonomy within Syria once the war against ISIS was over.72 These statements show 
some confusion; revealing that the relation between Damascus and Rojava was ambiguous 
during the last years.
As Turkey showed serious intents to interfere into the events in Syria after the outbreak of 
the Arab Spring, Damascus became determined to keep its northern neighbour out. It offered 
citizenship to the Kurds deprived from that due to the Decree of 1962. However, as clashes 
intensified in other parts of the country, and the Syrian government realized that it had no 
sufficient forces to maintain power in the north, it searched for a local actor who was able to 
provide security but did not bring the territory out of the Syrian state, and was willing to pre-
vent Turkish military from entering the country. After the President-ordered killing of Mashaal 
Tammo,73 founder and fellow activist of the Kurdish Future Movement Party, a vocal critic 
of the Syrian President and, more importantly, the Kurdish collaborator of the Turkey-backed 
opposition, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), local power in northern Syria shifted to the 
PYD. The Syrian regime not only had some experience of cooperation with the PYD due to its 
connection to the PKK, but there had also existed a complementary activity between them, for 
instance the PYD helped to crack down on Kurdish anti-regime demonstrators in Afrin in early 
2012, for its own interest which, however, coincided with that of the regime.74
The first town abandoned by the Syrian administration was Kobanî on 19 July 2012, 
followed by several others in the following days. The government forces withdrew without 
resistance, while the YPG prevented the rebelling Free Syrian Army (FSA) from entering the 
towns. During those months, the Syrian Army, YPG, FSA, and ISIS were all present in what 
later became Rojava. Clashes between YPG and the Syrian Army were sporadic; the first 
one occurred on 21 July 2012, just two days after the start of the withdrawal, in Qamishlo.
70 Hamidi, I. “Head of Kurdish People’s Protection Units: Damascus Declared War against us”. Asharq Al-Awsat, 
17 September 2017. https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1026421/head-kurdish-peoples-protection-units-
damascus-declared-war-against-us, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
71 The Russian support has long been vital for the survival of the Ba’ath Party regime. First, after signing an 
agreement on the Soviet (Russian) use of Tartus naval base in 1972, the Soviet Union helped to quell the ma-
jority Sunni insurgency against the regime by the early 1980s. Second, the Russian military intervention into 
the Syrian civil war in September 2015 clearly saved the regime from failing. On the history of Russian-Syrian 
partnership see Van Benthuysen, J. “In-between anarchy and interdependence: from state death to fragile and 
failing states”. Third World Quarterly 36/1. 2015. 32-34. DOI:10.1080/01436597.2015.976015
72 Jadallah, A. “Damascus Says Syrian Kurdish Autonomy Negotiable: Report”. US News. 26 September 2017. 
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-09-26/damascus-says-syrian-kurdish-autonomy-negotia-
ble-report, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
73 “Assad ordered killing of Kurdish activist Mashaal Tammo: Leaked files”. Al Arabiya English. 10 October 
2012. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/2012/10/10/Assad-ordered-killing-of-Kurdish-activist-Mashaal-Tammo-
Leaked-files.html, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
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The withdrawal was not complete: some area had been kept by the regime, the so called 
security boxes75 in Qamishlo and Hasakah, both important centres of Christian presence.76 
Anti-regime rebels usually considered Christians and other minorities as supporters of the 
regime and the mutual distrust between the sides led to the situation that the state had enough 
popular support to keep key positions in these areas, such as government buildings, border 
crossing points to Turkey, or the Qamishlo airport, even when the PYD/YPG seized the 
neighbouring regions. Similarly, the PYD was able to organize, and ‘neutralize’ the Kurdish 
populated Sheikh Maqsood neighbourhood in Aleppo amidst fierce confrontations between 
the rebels and government forces.
Since then, the relationship between the regime and Rojava mostly could have been 
described with expressions like mutual tolerance, even need sometimes, or live and let live, 
due to the parallel fight against the common enemies, the ISIS and Turkey. This mutual reli-
ance paradoxically led to situations like the praising of the YPG for its fight against Islamists 
by President Al-Assad in January 2013, at the same time when he failed to provide support 
for the Syrian Army confronting the YPG attempting that time to dislodge Syrian forces 
from the Kurdish territories.77 There were rumours that in 2014, during the siege of Kobanî, 
the Syrian Army furnished the YPG with military support; however, the YPG denied this.78 
Similarly, when the Syrian reconciliation minister visited Rojava in April 2015, he enunci-
ated that Damascus would provide further support for “Kurdish forces to defeat the terrorist 
organization”, and that there was no objection to the use of Kurdish flag if “everything re-
mains within a united Syria”.79 Last summer even presidential adviser Buthaina Shaban con-
firmed the weapon supply for the Kurdish forces when they had fought with ISIS, regretting 
that after joining efforts with the US, the SDF “lost contact with the regime”.80 
A new era came in early 2018, when Turkey attacked the Afrin region with ground forc-
es. Although Turkish military interventions and their various consequences will be detailed 
in Chapter V, they made clear the mutual interest for cooperation between the Autonomous 
Administration of North and East Syria and Damascus to minimize Turkey and its allies’ 
influence in Syria. The reason is not only the tangible Turkish military presence on Syrian 
soil, but also that Turkey aims to carry out long-term policies. After the Turkish invasion 
of Afrin, due to a settlement policy applied there by Turkey, the previously predominantly 
Kurdish-inhabited region turned into an ethnically mixed Kurdish-Arabic one.81 As men-
75 The two city centres with the bazaar and government buildings were kept by central administration and fortified 
by the regime security forces. In Qamishly, the airport also remained in the hands of Damascus.
76 Christians form around 10 percent of the population and traditionally have good cooperation with the Alawites, 
the backbone of the Assad-regime. Christians’ rights were recognized by the 1973 Constitution and respected 
by the regime. They are overrepresented within state administration and armed forces.
77 Van Wilgenburg, W. “Kurdish Forces Clash with Main Syrian Opposition in Syria, Reports Say”. Rudaw. 17 
January 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20130118175834/http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/syria/5666.
html, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
78 “Syria Providing Military Support to Kurds in Battle Against ISIS”. Haaretz. 27 October 2014. http://www.
haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.623051, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
79 Behlewî, D. “Syrian minister: we are providing military, financial support to Kurdish fighters”. Rudaw. 19 April 
2015. http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/19042015, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
80 “Buthaina Shaban: We provided SDF with weapons”. ARK. 2 September 2019. https://www.arknews.net/en/
node/12620, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
81 Izady, M. “Syria: Ethnic Shift 2010-mid 2018”. 2018. https://i.redd.it/umzbb3cu7lc21.png, Accessed on 24 
January 2020.
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tioned above, this region had been an important stronghold of the PKK in Syria, therefore 
weakening the Kurdish element there means decreasing the potential of the PKK.
Similarly to early 2018, another such cooperation between the Autonomous Administra-
tion of North and East Syria and Damascus was necessary in late 2019, when Turkey carried 
out another attack with ground forces ‘to secure’ the SDF-held areas just south to its border 
after the Trump administration ordered the withdrawal of the US forces from Rojava on 6 
October 2019. 
Despite the predominantly peaceful co-existence between the regional and the Syrian 
administrations, there were clashes between the sides first in the enclaves, later on the front-
lines. For instance, in early 2013 the Syrian Army (SAA) attacked the YPG-held ‘neutral’ 
Sheikh Maqsood neighbourhood in Aleppo, when FSA fighters sought shelter there. In April 
2016, fighting escalated in Qamishlo between local YPG and Syrian Army forces, after the 
Syrian forces started shelling a civilian neighbourhood as a response to an ISIS detonated 
car bomb in the town, and only the order of the top leaders of the two sides was able to ease 
the tensions.82
Just months later, in August 2016, fighting erupted between local YPG and government 
forces in Hasakah, where the Syrian Air Force had bombed Kurdish held territories for the 
first time since the beginning of the conflict. According to sources, the reason was the gov-
ernment’s discontent with the Rojava call of disbanding the National Defence Force, the 
backbone of state presence in Hasakah.83 After several days of fighting with the Asayish, the 
regime forces lost the majority of the territory previously controlled in the town; however, 
since an agreement was reached between the sides, they were allowed to keep key govern-
ment buildings in the centre.
In 2017, Soner Çağaptay, the political scientist of The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, identified four possible scenarios to which Rojava could be subjected, (1) the 
Transnistria model of a Russian vassal, (2) the Kosovo model of independence with partial 
recognition, (3) the Iraqi Kurdistan model of Turkish protection, and (4) the 1975 Algeria 
model of forced reintegration.84 It cannot be excluded that Damascus will try the fourth 
option;85 however, it is highly questionable whether Syria will have an opportunity and the 
capabilities for such a move. 
The second and third Turkish military invasions in 2018 and 2019 respectively, detailed 
in Chapter V, have also resulted in decreasing chances for an easy solution. Furthermore, the 
planned weakening of the Kurdish majority, due to Turkish settlement policies detailed in 
82 Sary, G. “Rojava’s Tortuous Relationship to the Syrian Regime”. LSE. 19 September 2016. http://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/mec/2016/09/19/rojavas-tortuous-relationship-to-the-syrian-regime/, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
83 “Syrian regime forces bomb Kurds in north for first time”. Hürriyet Daily News. 18 August 2016. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/syrian-regime-forces-bomb-kurds-in-north-for-first-time.aspx?page-
ID=238&nID=102997&NewsCatID=352, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
84 Cagaptay, S. “Rojava’s Future: Four Models Explained”. The Washington Institute. 5 June 2017. http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rojavas-future-four-models-explained, Accessed on 24 January 
2020.
85 In the 1970 peace accord between Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds, Saddam Hussein was willing to give autono-
my to the Kurdish region but the two sides could not agree on the question of Kirkuk. In 1974, the Iraqi Kurds 
restarted their struggle against the regime with Iranian and Israeli support. In response Saddam negotiated a deal 
with Iran (Algiers Agreement), leading Tehran to halt its support for Iraqi Kurdish groups. After that Saddam 
crushed the Kurdish revolt and forced his own version of autonomy on Kurdistan. Farouk-Sluglett, M. and 
Sluglett, P. Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001. 187–189.
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the next chapter, in the northern areas of Syria might seem to help also Damascus but it is 
predictable that any settlement will rather increase Turkey’s influence in the region instead 
of that of Damascus, of course, at the expense of the SDF.
V. TURKISH INVOLVEMENT – ROJAVA AS A THREAT FOR A NATO 
MEMBER STATE 
The Arab Spring in Syria posed Turkey a dilemma. During the preceding decade under the 
then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey adopted the so called zero-prob-
lems foreign policy with its neighbours. The relations with Syria were cordial at least, start-
ing even before the AKP era in Ankara. The two countries set aside their conflicts in 1998 
when Damascus finally ended the presence of the PKK in Syria and forced Abdullah Öçalan 
to leave the country.
In the first months of 2011, the Erdoğan government tried to convince the Assad regime 
to react peacefully to the demonstrations and negotiate with Islamist and secular opposition 
fractions. By the summer of 2011, it became obvious that the Syrian government had no 
intention in sharing power, and both the demonstrators and regime became more violent. 
Both the Turkish approach to the Syrian conflict and Damascus’ own reaction were heavily 
influenced by the Egyptian revolution and the Libyan civil war, where two long time dic-
tators were deposed. In Ankara’s understanding the fall of Hosni Mubarak and Moammer 
Qaddhafi indicated a similar fate for Bashar al Assad, hence Turkey threw its lot with the 
opposition.
Ankara had two objectives in the Syrian crisis. First, to support the opposition to over-
throw the Assad regime, and second to contain the activities of any PKK related organization 
within Syria. In the first years of the civil war, Turkey focused on building up and equip the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the assistance of Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Ankara also allowed 
foreigners to cross freely the country to join the armed opposition and jihadist groups in 
Syria. Most of the so called “foreign fighters” joined the Syrian al-Qaeda (Al Nusra Front) 
and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Until 2014 the Syrian Kurds received less attention from Ankara, mainly because they 
were internally weak, engaged in internal struggles and the opposition of the Assad regime 
in North Syria, rival to the YPG, had significant military power and international support. 
The situation changed at the siege of Kobanî as demonstrated in Chapter III. The military 
cooperation of the most powerful military of the world and the small non-state actor consid-
ered to be a terrorist organization rang the bell in Ankara, and from that moment the Turkey’s 
attention started to increase towards the “Rojava issue”.86 This was strengthened by the fact 
that from 2015, the YPG fought a two-fold campaign: while fighting according to US objec-
tives to liberate Raqqa, the “capital” of ISIS, the now rebranded Syrian Democratic Forces 
also aimed to connect the Kurdish populated entities of Qamishlo, Kobanî, and Afrin. The 
Erdoğan government considered this a vital threat and by 2016 containing the YDG expan-
sion had overshadowed even the previous top priority of Turkey in Syria: the overthrow of 
the Assad-regime. 
86 Egeresi Z. “Törökország Szíria-politikájának változása: a főbb dinamikák”. KKI Elemzések 8. 2020. 9. 
https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/08_KKI-elemzes_TUR-SYR_Egeresi_20200121.pdf, Accessed on 
24 January 2020.
32 HDR 2020, Nr. 1
For Ankara, the PYD/YPG is nothing more than an offshoot of the terrorist organiza-
tion PKK. The threat of connecting YPG-controlled areas along the whole Turkish-Syrian 
border therefore triggered the first open Turkish military intervention in Syria on 24 Au-
gust 2016.87 During Operation Euphrates Shield, the Turkish forces and parts of the FSA 
occupied the last segments of the ISIS “border” area with Turkey, and separated definitely 
the Kurdish held territories of Afrin and Kobanî/Qamishlo. The occupation was not only 
a military move, Turkey had far-reaching plans with the region, therefore it started an 
alternative society building by the resettlement of Syrian Turkomans and establishing in-
stitutions there.88  
In 2017, Turkey tried to expand its presence in Syria, moving both eastwards and west-
wards. The PYD intended to use conflicting interests of the international actors present on 
Syrian soil so when Turkish/FSA troops moved against Manbij to the West, the Kurds invit-
ed US troops to patrol in the Manbij area. When Turkish/FSA troops deployed against the 
city of Tell Rifaat to the East, the PYD invited Russia to act as a guarantor in the city and in 
the whole of Afrin canton in March 2017.89 Gradually Ankara became extremely frustrated 
by the PYD moves and understood the need to involve more the great powers (US and Rus-
sia) to be effective against the Syrian Kurds. 
Early 2017, Turkey together with Iran and Russia launched the “Astana format” of ne-
gotiations, a new proposal to bring together the Assad regime and those Syrian opposition 
parties which were willing to negotiate a ceasefire. Coordinating with Moscow and Tehran 
made Ankara an almost equal partner in the Syrian civil war although Turkey backed forces 
fighting against the regime and thus Russia and Iran. The Erdoğan administration used its 
newfound influence to push for a new military offensive against the YPG, which coincided 
with the Syrian government’s offensive against Eastern Ghouta, near Damascus.
Operation Olive Branch, the Turkish/FSA invasion of Kurdish-held Afrin canton, start-
ed on 20 January 2018. Damascus and Russia offered protection to the SDF if they handed 
over the region, but the Kurds refused the offer. By mid-March 2018, the SDF had been 
defeated and its forces withdrawn to other Kurdish-held areas. Tell Rifaat and the Menagh 
Air Base were handed over to the Syrian Army and Russian troops to prevent it falling into 
the hands of Turkish and FSA forces.90 Gradually, Operation Olive Branch turned into a 
humanitarian disaster; it led to the displacement of 150,000 people,91 mass human rights 
87 Turkish President Erdoğan stated that Turkey should be protected against “the terrorist groups of Daesh and 
PYD that threaten our country in northern Syria”. “Erdogan says Syria operation aimed at IS jihadists, Kurd-
ish PYD”. Daily Mail Online, 24 August 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3756119/Erdo-
gan-says-Syria-operation-aimed-IS-jihadists-Kurdish-PYD.html, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
88 Jarabulus border town under FSA control has been a show case: the town was connected to the Turkish electrical 
grid in September 2016, at the same time a new hospital was created there under the Turkish Ministry of Health, 
and in October 2017, the Turkish Post (PTT) opened a branch in the town.
89 Iddon, P. “The power plays behind Russia’s deconfliction in Afrin”. Rudaw. 10 September 2017. https://www.
rudaw.net/english/analysis/10092017, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
90 Russian forces were allowed to take over the airport even earlier, in October 2017. Illingworth, A. “Russian 
forces raise their flag above major Kurdish base in north Aleppo”. Al-Masdar News. 22 October 2017. https://
www.almasdarnews.com/article/video-russian-forces-raise-flag-major-kurdish-base-north-aleppo/, Accessed 
on 24 January 2020.
91 “Syria: Humanitarian Fund series – ‘Living here has taught me how strong I really am.’”. United Nation’s Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 7 August 2019. https://www.unocha.org/story/syria-%E2%80%-
9Ci-wonder-if-i-will-ever-go-home%E2%80%9D, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
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violations against the remaining local population,92 and to the colonisation of the occupied 
territories by the Turkish forces.93 The Turkish province of Hatay emerged as responsible for 
overseeing the activities of the local councils in Afrin canton and for helping with providing 
basic services. As Syrian researcher Khayrallah al-Hilu explained: After a few months of 
giving the armed factions free rein, Turkey has supported military and civilian police forces 
in order to achieve relative security in the area. Indeed, Ankara has been able to pull strings 
in Afrin among the armed factions and military and civilian police, along with their various 
specialised departments.94
Until today, the last round of Turkish military involvement in Syria started in Septem-
ber 2019. By that time, the confrontation between Turkey and the US reached new heights: 
Ankara decided to purchase the Russian made S-400 Triumph missile system, while Wash-
ington removed Turkey from the F-35 fifth generation fighter program. The US Congress 
threatened the Erdoğan administration with sanctions, while the Turkish President lobbied 
several times with Donald Trump to pull out US troops from NES. The withdrawal of troops 
from foreign mission was one of the campaign promises of the US President, although this 
was contrary to his administration’s declared policy. 
The withdrawal of the US troops was debated for a longer period of time. US Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced a deal 
in June 2018 aiming at joint patrolling in Manbij area and the withdrawal of YPG forces.95 
However, this agreement did not satisfy Turkey because it did not solve the problem of YPG 
presence along the Turkish-Syrian border. From Turkey’s perspectives: Ankara’s primary 
objective is to create a militarily protected safe zone that will be liberated from terror-
ist-designated YPG-entities, prevent the YPG’s territorial continuity in the eastern part of 
the Euphrates River, and then open up a territorial zone to protect Turkey’s border against, 
according to the Turkish narrative, any terrorist infiltration. The area mentioned is 40 km 
deep, 550 km long and harbours 22 US military bases.96
While Washington and Ankara continued their negotiations on a future “safe zone” in 
the border area, Turkish President Erdoğan kept threatening with a military invasion of the 
region. US diplomacy finally averted a new conflict by agreeing with Turkey on a new 
proposal regarding the territory between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers on 7 August 2019. 
92 “Between a Rock and a Hard Place – Civilians in North-western Syria”. United Nations Human Rights Office 
of the High Commissioner. Monthly Human Rights Digest, June 2018. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/ohchr_-_syria_monthly_human_rights_digest_-_june_2018.pdf, Accessed on 24 January 2020.
93 “The resettlement by the Turkish authorities continues to the people who have been displaced towards the 
Syrian North and more than 40 thousand persons have been settled in houses and Camps in Afrin area”. 
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95 Kanat, K. B. and Hannon, E. J. “The Manbij Roadmap and the Future of U.S.-Turkish Relations”. Middle East 
Policy 25/3. 2018. 111-123. DOI:10.1111/mepo.12365, Accessed on 3 January 2020.
96 Atmaca, N. “Safe Zones and Devil in Details: Turkey is Running out of Options”. NATO Defence College. 
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The buffer zone (“safe zone”) was to be 115 km long and 5 km deep. Between Tell Abyad 
and Ras Al-Ayn/Serakane, the depth of the buffer zone was extended to 14 km. The YPG/
SDF agreed to evacuate the area and destroy all defensive positions. US and Turkish forces 
agreed to conduct joint patrol.97
A new crisis emerged when US forces were suddenly ordered to withdraw from NES 
on 6 October 2019. President Trump’s decision was followed by a phone call to President 
Erdoğan, and also the commander of the SDF, Gen. Mazloum Kobani was informed about 
the decision. In the ensuing chaos Ankara ordered a limited incursion on a 100 km stretch 
between the towns of Tell Abyad and Ras Al-Ayn/Serakane. Like in the previous invasions, 
Operation Peace Spring included Turkish military forces and Syrian opposition groups un-
der the umbrella “National Army”, as well. On 15 October, a week after the beginning of the 
Turkish invasion, the PYD made a deal with the Syrian government. The Kurdish leadership 
had no other choice but to turn to Washington’s foes to deter further Turkish incursion.98 
While Ankara had largely achieved its objectives by that time, there were fears of further 
expansion of the previously declared 100 km wide and 30 km deep safe zone. Russian and 
Syrian forces deployed to SDF-held regions on three axis, to Manbij, Tell Tamr and Qamish-
lo. By the end of October 2019 hopes of NES had been shattered, the PYD and its militia 
lost its rule in the core Kurdish populated Syrian areas as seen on Map 3. Although President 
Trump’s decision on the full withdrawal was partly reversed, both his Secretary of Defense 
Jim Mattis and his Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk 
resigned in protest.99
The third Turkish military invasion resulted in mass displacement again, according to 
estimations around 300,000 people left the area, and Turkish and allied forces again com-
mitted mass human rights violations.100 What is even more worrying is the Turkish Presi-
dent’s plan to change the ethnic makeup of northern Syria along the border with Turkey for 
so-called security reasons. According to Ankara’s plan, around 1 million refugees would be 
settled into 140 villages in the 20-mile-deep area it controls in Northern Syria, in the frame-
work of a reconstruction program requiring more than $26 billion in foreign assistance.101 
The implementation of the program, obviously leading to the ethnic reengineering of the 
region, has already started.102 
97 Ant, O. “Turkey, U.S. Reach Agreement on Creating Buffer Zone in Syria”. Bloomberg. 7 August 2017. 
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VI. CONCLUSION – WHAT FUTURE FOR ROJAVA? 
The Middle East, where due to geopolitics a region called Rojava, now officially Autono-
mous Administration of North and East Syria emerged after 2012, has long been an instable 
region. The Kurdish-based entity used the opportunity the withdrawal of the Syrian adminis-
tration and military presented and brought into light its already working clandestine institu-
tions. With the ongoing international war against ISIS in the following years, the importance 
of the Kurdish fighters rose offering them the possibility to build society based on ideas 
extremely different from every other in the region.
The PYD, the leading force behind the transformation of Syrian Kurdistan, has been 
following a distinct leftist political programme inherited from Abdullah Öçalan and his or-
ganization, the PKK. This political vision differs from how Arab Nationalism, Islamism and 
Zionism intend to build society. Although secularism and socialist ideas are well-known in 
the Middle East, the equality of women and the egalitarian nature of economy (the existence 
of cooperatives and communes) create a significant difference in comparison to the Muslim 
countries. Furthermore, the recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of 
society and the lack of a nationalist discourse separates Rojava from almost every country 
in the region, including Israel. 
Politically, Rojava is not a plural democracy since governance is based on political 
exclusion; however, one of the core ideas is ethnic inclusion. Political exclusion ensures the 
required internal stability during the time of the fight against external threats, such as ISIS 
or Turkey, but after an eventual ceasefire it could impede the creation of a proper inclusive 
democracy, which Rojava has been trying to portray itself. Yet, the sustainability of a demo-
cratic Kurdish or at least multi-ethnic state in the Middle East is problematic in itself, should 
peace come without political pluralism, the Rojava experience could turn into a failure.
Geopolitics has traditionally been influencing the fate both of the Kurds and Rojava. 
Shifting geopolitical balance allowed the PYD to create its self-proclaimed autonomous 
region in 2012, and to increase its territory between 2012 and 2017, but it also resulted 
in significant throwbacks and a loss of territory in the past years. The Syrian Kurds have 
experienced bitter disappointments: both Russia and the US sacrificed Kurdish interests for 
their own geopolitical goals. The fall of ISIS resulted in a more determined Turkey stepping 
up against Rojava: since 2016, there have been three ground military operations resulting 
in significant decrease of the SDF-held territories and weakening their heartland. Neverthe-
less, Rojava’s existence is still a necessity for the international community, which leads to a 
joint interest in not letting Turkey conquering the whole of the territory the PYD has, and to 
cooperation between the SDF and the US and Russia simultaneously, despite the latter two 
being opponents in Syria. 
The ongoing Syrian conflict has reshaped the ethnic composition of Syria, yet the case 
of the Afrin region is particular: with settling Arabs there, the Turkish invaders intentionally 
decreased the share of the Kurds in a previously predominantly Kurdish, and especially 
PKK-supporting territory. This ethnic re-engineering might have far-reaching consequenc-
es, as it is hardly likely that Turkey will ever allow the recreation of the previous Kurdish 
stronghold there. Such an ethnic re-engineering might not be the case in the territories oc-
cupied in late 2019, where the majority was Arab even before the outbreak of the Civil War. 
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that there will be more Turkish attacks against still SDF/
YPG-controlled territories where similar problems could occur as in Afrin.
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The future of Syria itself is obscure, and so is that of Rojava. It is certain that an in-
dependent Kurdish state might not break away from either one or more countries in the 
Middle East soon, if ever. Deepening cooperation between Rojava and the Syrian regime 
for a united Syria and for the least possible Turkish influence in it could be more viable. 
Such cooperation, with strong international pressure and appropriate guarantees for Turkey, 
eventually could lead to the withdrawal of the Turkish ground forces from Syria on the long 
run, which is a common interest of Damascus and the Autonomous Administration of North 
and East Syria. Yet, geopolitics and the actual stance of the Syrian Civil War make such a 
withdrawal-scenario currently highly unlikely. What is more probable is that Rojava gradu-
ally becomes more and more reliant on the Syrian regime, however, due to the existence of 
the US Army bases in the region and the inadequate resources the Syrian regime has, it will 
be able to maintain its separateness. International economic and military interests also make 
this scenario probable; however, as we have seen, shifts in geopolitics easily make the future 
unpredictable in the Middle East. 
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